pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyperforms runtime compilation of C source code into a shared object file usinggcc. This library is then injected into the LibreOffice (soffice) process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to modify system call behavior. This combination of compilation and injection represents a high-risk dynamic execution pattern used for system-level workarounds. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runacross several scripts (soffice.py,thumbnail.py,redlining.py) to execute external binaries includinggcc,soffice,pdftoppm, andgitfor document processing and validation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PowerPoint files, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via the following chain:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through
markitdowntext extraction and by reading slide XML files (e.g.,slide{N}.xml) during editing workflows. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not employ specific markers or delimiters to isolate extracted content from the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill maintains the ability to execute system commands, write to the filesystem, and manipulate complex document XML.
- Sanitization: Security is improved through the use of
defusedxmlfor XML parsing and the implementation of XSD schema validation before documents are repacked.
Audit Metadata