skills/huangzida/skills/pptx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pptx

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py performs runtime compilation of C source code into a shared object file using gcc. This library is then injected into the LibreOffice (soffice) process via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to modify system call behavior. This combination of compilation and injection represents a high-risk dynamic execution pattern used for system-level workarounds.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run across several scripts (soffice.py, thumbnail.py, redlining.py) to execute external binaries including gcc, soffice, pdftoppm, and git for document processing and validation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PowerPoint files, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via the following chain:
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through markitdown text extraction and by reading slide XML files (e.g., slide{N}.xml) during editing workflows.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not employ specific markers or delimiters to isolate extracted content from the agent's internal logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill maintains the ability to execute system commands, write to the filesystem, and manipulate complex document XML.
  • Sanitization: Security is improved through the use of defusedxml for XML parsing and the implementation of XSD schema validation before documents are repacked.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 04:20 PM