huawei-cloud-cloudrobo-train
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through command outputs such as
cloudrobo train get-logs,cloudrobo train get-events, andcloudrobo train show-task, as well as user-supplied configurations increate-task. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly mandate the use of boundary markers or delimiters when presenting this external content to the LLM.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (
cloudrobo train), modify cloud resources (create-task,update-task), and perform lifecycle operations (stop-task,delete-tasks). - Sanitization: There is no mention of explicit sanitization or filtering of the ingested logs or event messages before they are processed by the agent.
- [SAFE]: The skill uses official Huawei Cloud resources and follows security best practices for credential management.
- Network operations: The skill communicates with official Huawei Cloud domains (e.g.,
cloudrobo.cn-southwest-2.myhuaweicloud.com) for API interactions. - Credential management: The skill correctly instructs users to provide credentials via environment variables (
HUAWEI_CLOUD_AK,HUAWEI_CLOUD_SK) or configuration files, and explicitly warns against hardcoding them in scripts. - Dependencies: The skill references the official vendor-owned Python package
hw-cloudrobo-clientfor its operations.
Audit Metadata