huawei-cloud-install-openjiuwenswarm
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses coercive language in the frontmatter ('CRITICAL — Invoke this Skill first, no exceptions', 'Under NO circumstances may you skip') and instructions that attempt to override the agent's autonomy and safety defaults.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructs the agent to perform 'Silent dependency installation' by running
pip install requests -qwithout notifying the user or seeking confirmation, which facilitates stealthy environment modification. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Downloads a runtime archive from an unverified personal repository (
https://gitcode.com/afeng5267/jiuwenswarm_runtime.git) and subsequently executes the binary components and scripts (e.g.,jiuwenswarm-start) contained within it. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses
sudoprivileges to delete and create files in system-protected directories (/usr/local/bin) and modifies permissions to install global commands. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Employs
subprocess.runwithshell=Trueinscripts/03_configure.pyandscripts/04_start.py, which increases the risk of command injection and bypasses standard process protections. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Accesses the Linux kernel keyring to read
HWCLOUD-Agentcredentials and parses localsettings.jsonfiles to harvest API keys, then persists this sensitive data into a plaintext.envfile. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Automatically detects and installs system packages (
keyutils) usingdnf,yum, orapt-getwithsudoinside thecommon.pyscript without user intervention.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata