skills/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-skills/huawei-cloud-modelarts-vllm-ascend-model-deploy/Gen Agent Trust Hub
huawei-cloud-modelarts-vllm-ascend-model-deploy
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell commands via scripts like
scripts/check_artifacts.py(usingbash -nfor syntax validation) andscripts/pull_push_image.sh(usingdockerfor image management). These are well-contained and necessary for the deployment workflow. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches model metadata and documentation from
docs.vllm.ai, container images fromquay.io, and model weights fromhuggingface.coormodelscope.cn. These are well-known, trusted services for AI development, and the skill provides explicit instructions to verify these sources using-konly after hostname validation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external model documentation and user-provided configuration paths, creating a potential attack surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: Documentation pages from
docs.vllm.ai, model repository IDs, and user-supplied OBS/SWR paths. - Boundary markers: The skill includes mandatory security guidelines in
SKILL.mdrequiring URL whitelisting and input validation before any data is passed to tools. - Capability inventory: API interactions in
create_infer_service.py, file operations inupload_code_to_obs.py, and container operations inpull_push_image.sh. - Sanitization: The skill instructions mandate the use of regex and whitelist validation for all user-supplied and externally-fetched inputs before command interpolation.
- [SAFE]: The skill follows security best practices by recommending environment variables or protected files for IAM token handling, explicitly checking for 600 file permissions, and providing clear troubleshooting for resource cleanup.
Audit Metadata