huawei-cloud-skill-audit
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's installation script
scripts/skill_audit.pyattempts to download thegitleaksbinary from third-party GitHub proxies such asgh-proxy.comandgh.ddlc.top. - Evidence:
mirrors = [f"https://gh-proxy.com/...", f"https://gh.ddlc.top/..."]. One of these URLs was flagged as malicious/phishing by automated scanning tools. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The downloaded binary is automatically extracted and installed into a system directory, and subsequently invoked by the skill's logic.
- Evidence:
tf.extractall(path="/usr/local/bin")inscripts/skill_audit.py. This binary is later executed viasubprocessinscripts/checks/gitleaks_check.py. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runwithshell=Trueto execute various system commands, which increases the risk of command injection if parameters are not perfectly sanitized. - Evidence:
subprocess.run(shell_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)inscripts/skill_audit.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted skill directories, providing an opportunity for indirect prompt injection if the output report influences subsequent agent actions.
- Ingestion points:
discover_skillsfunction inscripts/skill_audit.pyreads all files in the target directory. - Boundary markers: The skill includes logic to detect prompt injection (skillspector rules P1-P5) but lacks explicit escaping for the report generation itself.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, write to the file system (reports), and install packages via pip.
- Sanitization: Uses
shlex.quotefor some command arguments, but usesshell=Truefor execution.
Recommendations
- CRITICAL: 1 file(s) identified as malware by FileRep - DO NOT USE
- AI detected serious security threats
- Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata