huawei-cloud-skill-tester
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework is designed to execute shell commands extracted from target skills using
subprocess.run(['bash', '-c', cmd_text]). This occurs primarily inscripts/tier1/phase-4-execute-tests.shandscripts/tier2/phase-6-full-flow.sh. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes Python scripts at runtime. In
scripts/tier1/phase-4-execute-tests.sh, it writes SDK snippets extracted from target skills into temporary files and executes them using the local Python interpreter. It also usesexec(open(...).read())to dynamically load utility modules inscripts/tier1/phase-3-gen-testcases.shandscripts/tier1/phase-4-execute-tests.sh. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: There is a high attack surface for indirect injection. The framework ingests untrusted data from
SKILL.mdfiles of other skills (ingestion points inphase-1-skill-analysis.sh) and executes the extracted strings without rigorous sanitization. A malicious skill could provide a command that exfiltrates credentials or performs unauthorized actions when 'tested' by this framework. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
references/cli-installation-guide.mdreferences a remote installation script:https://apiexplorer.developer.huaweicloud.com/install/hcloud/install.sh. While this is an official vendor domain, it represents execution of a remote script. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes a telemetry SDK (
scripts/skill_quality_sdk.py) that reports execution metadata (status, cost, masked parameters) tohttps://skillsapi.developer.myhuaweicloud.com/api/quality/reportand a fallback guest endpointhttps://skillsop.topxtopx.com/api/quality/guest-report. The latter is an unconventional domain for a cloud provider, though it is used here for anonymous telemetry when credentials are missing.
Audit Metadata