conversation-inbox-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests conversation thread data (subjects, metadata) from the HubSpot API, which can contain content from untrusted external sources (email senders or chat participants).
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched using
hubspot conversations threads listand stored in/tmp/threads.jsonlas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None; the instructions do not include specific delimiters to protect the agent from processing malicious content embedded in thread data as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes commands to modify thread assignments and archive threads, creating a path for automated actions based on untrusted input.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation of the data retrieved from the API before it is processed or summarized.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided bash scripts (e.g.,
assign_threadsandarchive_threadsinSKILL.md) interpolate variables extracted from API JSON output directly into shell command strings. This pattern relies on the integrity of the data returned by the HubSpot service to prevent command injection. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill exposes conversation metadata locally by writing JSONL data—including thread IDs, statuses, and timestamps—to the world-readable
/tmpdirectory (e.g.,/tmp/inboxes.jsonl,/tmp/threads.jsonl). In multi-user or shared environments, this constitutes a risk of information disclosure.
Audit Metadata