huggingface-lora-space-builder
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Jun 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGH
Full Analysis
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt explicitly instructs the agent to ask the user to "Paste [the Hugging Face token] here" and to reuse that token for repo reads/publishing, forcing the LLM to receive and handle a secret value in-chat (risking verbatim exposure).
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.85). The skill ingests outsider-authored free text from the LoRA’s Hub model card/README (e.g.,
ModelCard.load(repo_id)andbase_card.text), which is then placed into the agent’s LLM context to extract parameters/UI details—this is indirect prompt-injection exposure from arbitrary third-party README content.
MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
- Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly recommends installing remote packages at build/runtime (e.g. "git+https://github.com/huggingface/diffusers" and "git+https://github.com/Lightricks/LTX-Video.git" in requirements.txt) and loading third‑party browser JS via CDNs (e.g. https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/...), which will be fetched and executed during Space build or in the client and thus constitute runtime external code execution.
Issues (3)
W007
HIGHInsecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
W012
MEDIUMUnverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
Audit Metadata