figure-composer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface. It ingests data from external sources, specifically CSV/Parquet files and user-provided PNG images, and interpolates content from these files directly into prompts for the agent's panel generation and review tasks.
  • Ingestion points: derive_outline_prompt (reads PNG pixels), panel_task (incorporates data_path and claim from the outline), and composite_review_task (spot-checks plotted values against CSV files).
  • Boundary markers: While the generated prompts use markdown headers for structure, they lack explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' delimiters for the interpolated data fields.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes image manipulation via PIL and matplotlib, file system reads/writes for PNGs, and prompt interpolation. It does not possess network access.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for external content (like claims or messages) before they are placed into instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the user to execute its core logic via exec(open("figure-composer/kernel.py").read()). While this is a common pattern for loading agent skills in certain environments, it involves the execution of local scripts which could be targeted if the skill directory is compromised.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 1, 2026, 05:34 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — figure-composer