pdf-explore
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF content, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where adversarial text in a document could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Functions such as
pdf_pages,pdf_scan, andpdf_grepinkernel.pyread text and images directly from user-provided PDF files. - Boundary markers: The skill does not currently implement specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the extracted PDF text.
- Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are restricted to local PDF parsing and image rendering; it does not have access to the network or sensitive system credentials.
- Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization is applied to the extracted text before it is returned to the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external Python libraries for PDF processing and image rendering.
- Evidence: The setup instructions in
SKILL.mdrecommend installingpypdfium2andpillowvia pip. These are well-known, legitimate packages from the official Python Package Index. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic execution to initialize its helper functions within the agent's environment.
- Evidence: The skill instructions use
exec(open(...).read())to load thekernel.pyfile. This is a standard method for loading this skill's logic into the active session.
Audit Metadata