proteinmpnn
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to clone source code from a third-party GitHub repository (
https://github.com/dauparas/ProteinMPNN.git) which is not managed by a verified organization. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute a Python script (
protein_mpnn_run.py) directly from the cloned repository. Downloading and executing code from an unverified third-party source poses a significant security risk if the source repository is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill builds shell commands using user-controllable arguments like
--pdb_path,--pdb_path_chains, and--sampling_temp. Executing these via the shell without sanitization is a high-risk pattern. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user data and interpolates it into executable commands without proper safeguards.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied PDB file paths, chain identifiers, and sampling temperature strings (SKILL.md, lines 35-38).
- Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify how to delimit user input or warn the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
git,pip, andpythonto perform network operations, package installation, and script execution. - Sanitization: Absent; there are no instructions for escaping, validating, or filtering user-provided parameters before they are used in shell commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata