literature-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
kernel.pyexecutes the shell commandgit config user.emailusingsubprocess.runto retrieve the user's identity from their local environment.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The user's email address, collected from environment variables or via local command execution, is transmitted to external servers (api.crossref.organddoi.org) as part of theUser-AgentHTTP header.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's setup instructions inSKILL.mddirect the agent to execute the Python helper script at runtime usingexec(open(...).read()), which dynamically loads local code into the agent's environment.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents an indirect injection surface by ingesting untrusted scholarly metadata from OpenAlex and Crossref APIs into the agent's context. Evidence chain: 1) Ingestion points:search_openalexandcrossref_lookupinkernel.py. 2) Boundary markers: Absent. 3) Capability inventory: Network access (urllib.request) and shell execution (subprocess.run). 4) Sanitization: The skill includes a deterministicstyle_passfunction to mitigate risks by avoiding LLM-based corrections of retrieved text.
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