reflect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to analyze conversation history which includes untrusted data such as raw user input and external tool outputs.
- Ingestion points: Conversation history is ingested in
SKILL.md(Process Step 1) and passed to reviewer sub-agents. - Boundary markers: Robust security warnings are included in all reviewer and synthesizer prompts (
references/divergent-reviewer.md,references/judgment-reviewer.md,references/tooling-reviewer.md,references/synthesizer.md) instructing the agent to treat history as untrusted and ignore any embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify repository files (via
skill-creator) and write to external issue trackers, though these actions are mediated by specialized tools. - Sanitization: A mandatory human-in-the-loop approval step (Step 5) is implemented for all state-changing edits, ensuring the user reviews and authorizes any skill modifications before they are applied.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Sub-agents are authorized to use MCP tools to retrieve data from external services to verify evidence.
- The prompts in
references/*.mdpermit the use of MCP tools to look up referenced context from sources like ticket trackers, documentation, and observability platforms. These lookups are restricted to read-only access and are strictly scoped to evidence cited within the task history.
Audit Metadata