solution-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection attack surface (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from external sources and processes it through a chain of agents with filesystem writing capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The
research-agent.mduses theWebSearchtool to retrieve case studies, competitor approaches, and practitioner insights from the internet based on the user's problem statement. - Boundary markers: The agent instructions lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the retrieved web content, which could lead to subsequent agents (such as
initiative-generator-agent) being influenced by malicious text found on searched pages. - Capability inventory: The skill manifest (
SKILL.md) allows the use ofBash,WebFetch, andReadtools. The orchestrator instructions include writing results to the.agents/directory and.agents/meta/out-of-scope/paths. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content retrieved from the web is performed before it is interpolated into the prompts of downstream agents.
Audit Metadata