submit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a variety of shell commands and local scripts using data derived from commit messages and PR metadata.
- Evidence: The skill uses
git commit,git push,gh pr create,gh pr edit, and Sapling commands likesl metaeditandsl pr submit. - Arguments for these commands, such as
--title "<title>", are directly populated from commit titles and PR views, which could lead to command injection if the agent's execution environment does not properly escape these variables. - The skill also executes local scripts including
scripts/pr-info,scripts/pr-resolve-threads, andscripts/gh-upload. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and processes data from external sources that can be controlled by third parties (e.g., via shared repositories or PR comments).
- Ingestion points: The skill reads commit messages via
git log -1 --format=%B(local but potentially from other contributors) and retrieves PR titles and bodies viagh pr view <number> --json title,body(remote content from GitHub). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard embedded instructions within the fetched commit messages or PR bodies.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to perform
git push, create or edit GitHub PRs (gh pr create/edit), upload files (scripts/gh-upload), and resolve review threads (scripts/pr-resolve-threads). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from GitHub or local git logs before it is re-incorporated into new PR descriptions or command arguments.
Audit Metadata