evaluating-llms-harness
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted outputs from language models to calculate benchmarks, creating an attack surface where malicious model output could target the evaluator or the agent environment.
- Ingestion points: Model predictions across 60+ benchmarks (e.g., MMLU, GSM8K) and custom datasets described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/custom-tasks.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions use standardized prompt templates, but the snippets do not show explicit sanitization or strict delimiters to prevent instruction leakage from model outputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill documentation suggests using
os.systemfor automation (SKILL.md) andsubprocessfor code execution during benchmarks (references/custom-tasks.md). - Sanitization: Absent in the provided workflow examples, as the focus is on metric extraction.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of generated code at runtime to verify functional correctness for benchmarks like HumanEval.
- The documentation explicitly notes that the
--allow_code_executionflag is required for these tasks, placing the security choice with the user. - Example utilities in
references/custom-tasks.mddemonstrate the use ofsubprocessto run code blocks against test cases for code evaluation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides scripts and Python snippets that use
os.systemand shell commands to orchestrate training checkpoints and aggregate multi-model results inSKILL.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and installs well-known packages from established repositories and services, including
lm-evalfrom EleutherAI,transformersfrom HuggingFace, andvllm. These are recognized as standard, reputable sources in the AI community.
Audit Metadata