llm-wiki
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPERSISTENCEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides explicit templates and instructions for creating a systemd user service (
obsidian-wiki-sync.service) to run synchronization processes continuously in the background. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Instructions include the use of
sudo loginctl enable-linger $USER, a command that requires elevated privileges to allow user processes to persist after a session ends. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data from external sources and synthesize it into a knowledge base, creating a vulnerability surface where malicious content could influence future agent actions.
- Ingestion points: Raw sources are collected from URLs (via
web_extract), PDFs, and user-provided text files, which are saved in theraw/directory. - Boundary markers: The skill uses YAML frontmatter and custom provenance markers (e.g.,
^[raw/articles/...]) for metadata and tracing, but these do not provide security isolation between ingested content and the agent's instructions. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to read and write local files, search the filesystem, and execute Python code for linting tasks.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing external content or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the source material before it is processed and incorporated into the wiki.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends the installation of external tools from non-whitelisted sources, specifically the
obsidian-headlesspackage via NPM and thellm-wiki-compilerrepository on GitHub. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
Lintsection provides a Python code template for the agent to use withexecute_codeto programmatically scan and analyze wiki files for orphans and broken links.
Audit Metadata