touchdesigner-mcp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/setup.shscript is designed to download atwozero.toxbinary fromhttps://www.404zero.com/pisang/twozero.tox. This resource is hosted on a third-party domain that does not match the provided vendor context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to run an automated
setup.shscript via bash. This script executes system commands (such aspgrep,nc, andcurl) and utilizes a Python subprocess to programmatically modify the agent'sconfig.yamlfile, injecting a new MCP server entry into the configuration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is heavily focused on ingesting data from external sources and using it to influence application behavior, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: As described in
references/external-data.mdandreferences/midi-osc.md, the skill reads data from HTTP APIs, WebSockets, MQTT brokers, Serial devices, and OSC network messages. - Boundary markers: The skill body lacks specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings for data being passed from external inputs into TouchDesigner parameters.
- Capability inventory: The
td_execute_pythontool, as documented inreferences/mcp-tools.md, provides full access to the TouchDesigner Python API and the local filesystem as the process user. - Sanitization: While the documentation mentions basic JSON error handling, it does not provide comprehensive sanitization or escaping mechanisms to prevent malicious data from manipulating the Python execution context.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
references/external-data.mdfile advises users to usesudo chmod 666on macOS to modify device permissions for serial port access, which is a significant privilege modification.
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