merge-dependabot-prs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the GitHub CLI (
gh) andgitvia theBashtool to interact with repositories. This includes fetching metadata, merging pull requests, and approving workflow runs. While these are high-privilege operations, the skill instructions include mandatory user confirmation steps for risky actions such as bypassing branch protection or merging major version updates. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub pull requests, including titles, bodies, and commit messages. Specifically, in Step 5 ('Assess the majors'), the agent is instructed to read release notes and changelogs to determine the risk of an upgrade. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker could embed malicious instructions in a pull request description or release notes.
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/dependabot_prs.py(inprint_notesanddetails_blocks) extracts text from the PR body and commit messages.SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to read these extracted notes during assessment. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define clear delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the processed PR content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to merge PRs (
gh pr merge), comment on PRs (gh pr comment), and approve workflow runs (gh api ... approve). - Sanitization: The
dependabot_prs.pyscript performs basic HTML-to-text conversion and strips detail blocks, but it does not perform semantic validation of the content, leaving it to the LLM to interpret safely.
Audit Metadata