proposal-publish
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a handover mechanism where it scans the local workspace for custom build definitions such as
proposal-buildscripts,Makefile, orjustfile. If detected, the skill halts its default processing and instructs the agent to run the discovered code. - Ingestion points: The
scripts/publish.pyscript performs a directory traversal of the proposal's parent folder to identify executable files or build recipes matching theproposal-buildnaming convention. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters or validation logic for the content of the workspace-supplied scripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runto executepandocandtypst. Additionally, the markdown instructions inSKILL.mdgrant the agent permission to use shell capabilities to execute untrusted code found in the workspace. - Sanitization: None. The skill relies on the agent to execute code paths discovered in the user's local environment without integrity verification.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly mandate that the agent execute arbitrary scripts or targets found in the workspace when a handover condition is met. - Evidence: "When one is found, publish builds nothing and exits 3, naming what it found. Run that definition and relay its output."
- Evidence: "Run it with: PROPOSAL_PATH=... [runner] [target]"
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides installation guidance for external document processing tools. These references point to well-known and reputable software repositories and package managers.
- Evidence: Guidance to install
pandocandtypstviawinget(Microsoft),brew(Homebrew), or official Linux distribution packages.
Audit Metadata