chrome-devtools
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
scripts/install-deps.shscript requires root privileges to install system-level dependencies for Chrome. While this is a standard requirement for running headless browsers on Linux, it involves the execution of commands withsudo. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/screenshot.jsutility usesexecSyncto invoke ImageMagick (magickorconvert) for automatic screenshot compression. Although the script attempts to wrap file paths in double quotes, there is a theoretical risk of command injection if the agent is manipulated into using a maliciously crafted output filename. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/evaluate.jsscript explicitly useseval()to execute JavaScript strings provided as command-line arguments within the page context. This is the intended functionality of the tool but represents a high-capability execution surface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process arbitrary web content. This content could contain instructions intended to exploit the agent's browser automation capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Browser content loaded via
navigate.js,snapshot.js, orevaluate.js(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None explicitly used for external data separation.
- Capability inventory: Full browser control, file writes (screenshots, traces, JSON reports), and execution of JavaScript in-page (scripts/evaluate.js).
- Sanitization: The
scripts/lib/selector.jsfile includes avalidateXPathfunction that implements a blocklist for dangerous patterns like<script>oronerror=to mitigate injection via element selectors.
Audit Metadata