videocut
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill extracts audio from user videos and uploads it to
https://uguu.se/upload. This is a public, anonymous file-hosting service. Uploading potentially sensitive user data to an untrusted third-party platform represents a high risk of data exposure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The server scripts
review_server.jsandsubtitle_server.jsutilizechild_process.execSyncto run shell commands likeffmpegandffprobe. These commands are constructed using file paths and arguments passed directly from the environment or user input without sufficient sanitization, creating a significant attack surface for command injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow relies on the Volcengine ASR API for transcription. While this is a known commercial service, the skill also utilizes anonymous hosting services to bridge data for the API, involving the transfer of local data to remote servers outside the user's control.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
skills/自进化/module implements a 'self-evolution' mechanism where the agent is instructed to update its own logic and rule files based on context and user feedback. This creates a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection; malicious data processed by the agent (such as a poisoned video transcript) could result in the permanent alteration of the skill's instructions or security configuration. - Ingestion points: Transcription results from Volcengine API in
volcengine_result.json. - Boundary markers: None identified in processing scripts.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
ffmpegand file system writes inreview_server.js. - Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the transcription data before processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata