dream
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill extracts knowledge from local conversation transcripts and transmits it to a service named Sibyl. The documentation explicitly describes Sibyl as a "multi-machine access (network service)," indicating that harvested data—which may contain proprietary code, credentials, or personal information from past sessions—is sent to an external destination.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands like
find,grep, andlsto search for and read sensitive log files located in~/.claude/projectsand~/.codex/sessions. These directories contain the full history of user interactions with Claude Code and Codex, representing a high-value target for data harvesting.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions rely onpython3 -cto execute dynamic code snippets for parsing JSONL data. This pattern is used to process potentially large volumes of conversation content harvested from the file system.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from historical conversation transcripts. It lacks explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic when reading these files, creating a vulnerability where instructions previously discussed or outputted in a session (e.g., "ignore your consolidation rules") could be re-activated and influence the agent during the dream cycle. Findings are supported by: - Ingestion points: Reads
.jsonlfiles from~/.claude/projectsand~/.codex/sessions(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The extraction guide focuses on quality but does not provide delimiters to prevent the agent from obeying embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: Uses
find,grep,python3 -c, andsibyl add(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata