active-directory-attack

Fail

Audited by Snyk on May 26, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt repeatedly instructs embedding plaintext credentials, passwords, and hashes directly into commands and tool parameters (e.g., user:password, -p 'Password123', --ldappassword, /credpassword, NTLM_HASH/HASH placeholders), which forces the agent to handle and potentially output secret values verbatim, creating an exfiltration risk.

CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

  • Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). This content is an explicit offensive playbook detailing step‑by‑step techniques for credential theft (Kerberoasting, AS‑REP, DCSync), lateral movement and remote execution (Pass‑the‑Hash/Ticket, NTLM relay, psexec/wmiexec), and persistent backdoors and domain compromise (Golden/Silver/Diamond/Sapphire tickets, Skeleton Key, DSRM backdoor, DCShadow), i.e., clearly intended to enable malicious Active Directory compromise.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt explicitly instructs actions that alter system and domain state and require elevated privileges (e.g., "sudo date -s", Set-ItemProperty to change DSRM behavior, Add-DomainObjectAcl, account/ACL creation via relay and Mimikatz), so it pushes the agent to compromise the host/environment.

Issues (3)

W007
HIGH

Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

E006
CRITICAL

Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
May 26, 2026, 08:56 AM
Issues
3
Security Audit — snyk — active-directory-attack