ai-security

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONOBFUSCATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides extensive reference material and automated payloads for testing direct and indirect prompt injection.
  • Evidence includes techniques such as instruction overrides, system-prompt extraction, and multi-turn jailbreaks (e.g., Crescendo and Skeleton Key) documented in references/prompt-injection-jailbreak.md.
  • The promptinject_harness.py script automates the delivery of these payloads to test the robustness of target model safety filters.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple Python scripts are provided to perform local and remote security assessments.
  • mcp_tool_audit.py recursively scans source code and configuration files for command injection sinks and manifest drift.
  • model_scan.py disassembles and analyzes pickle bytecode to identify dangerous globals and deserialization risks without executing the model code.
  • [OBFUSCATION]: The toolkit includes functionality to generate and test obfuscated payloads intended to bypass safety classifiers.
  • The token_smuggle function in promptinject_harness.py utilizes Base64 encoding, Unicode homoglyphs, and token fragmentation.
  • Reference materials in references/prompt-injection-jailbreak.md discuss the use of ROT13, leetspeak, and other encoding schemes for adversarial testing.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the detection of RCE vulnerabilities in AI infrastructure.
  • It identifies risks associated with insecure pickle loading in PyTorch and inference servers (e.g., CVE-2025-32434 and CVE-2025-32444).
  • The scripts interact with remote model endpoints via standard HTTP requests to evaluate their security posture.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill evaluates systems for indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities through the ingestion of untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: The scripts ingest MCP configuration files, tool manifests, source code, RAG corpora, and prompt lists (e.g., in mcp_tool_audit.py, rag_poisoner.py, and promptinject_harness.py).
  • Boundary markers: Reference documentation discusses the implementation and bypass of delimiters such as %%% END USER %%% to separate instructions from data.
  • Capability inventory: The toolkit can perform network POST requests, write assessment results to local files, and scan local directory structures for vulnerabilities.
  • Sanitization: As a security research tool, the scripts are designed to handle and generate potentially malicious data rather than sanitize it, placing the responsibility for safety on the target system's implementation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 23, 2026, 04:15 AM