container-k8s-escape
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill implements multiple techniques to bypass container isolation and escalate privileges. This includes using
nsenterto join host namespaces, exploitingCAP_SYS_ADMINforrelease_agentescapes, and manipulatingcore_patternto execute arbitrary code as host root. - [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]:
scripts/escape_enum.shand the post-escape playbook inreferences/node-host-pivot.mdprovide automated methods for harvesting high-value information, including Kubernetes ServiceAccount tokens, kubeconfig files, etcd server keys, and cloud instance metadata (IMDS) from AWS, GCP, and Azure. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The toolkit includes scripts like
scripts/kubelet_exec.pyandscripts/runc_cwd_escape.pythat facilitate unauthorized command execution across pods and host environments by exploiting runtime working-directory leaks and kubelet API misconfigurations, such as thenodes/proxyGET path. - [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: Documentation within the skill (
references/node-host-pivot.md) details methods for maintaining access to compromised nodes, such as injecting SSH keys into the host's root directory and deploying static pod manifests in/etc/kubernetes/manifests/to ensure automatic, stealthy execution of attacker code. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:
scripts/nvidiascape_build.shfacilitates an OCI-hook escape (CVE-2025-23266) by compiling a malicious shared object at runtime and building a container image that triggers a privileged host-side NVIDIA hook to load the attacker's library. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's metadata and instructional content promote offensive actions and provide functional exploit code, posing a significant risk if deployed in an environment where the agent has access to containerized or orchestrated workloads.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata