using-offensive-claude
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs strong directive language intended to override the agent's default decision-making process. Specifically, it uses phrases like 'ABSOLUTELY MUST', 'not negotiable', and 'cannot rationalize your way out of it' to ensure the agent follows the framework's skill-invocation logic.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Establishes an instruction hierarchy where the skill's rules and user instructions are explicitly prioritized over the agent's default behavior, which is a common pattern for defining specific agent personas but technically constitutes a behavioral override.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by prioritizing external content (such as
CLAUDE.mdandscope.json) as the highest instruction priority without specifying sanitization or boundary markers. - Ingestion points:
CLAUDE.md,scope.json, and direct user requests are used to determine engagement tasks and boundaries. - Boundary markers: Lacks explicit delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the data ingested from the user or external files.
- Capability inventory: The skill manages and routes to 31 other technique-focused skills (e.g., recon, exploit-dev, cloud) using the
Skilltool. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the contents of
CLAUDE.mdorscope.jsonis described.
Audit Metadata