using-offensive-claude

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs strong directive language intended to override the agent's default decision-making process. Specifically, it uses phrases like 'ABSOLUTELY MUST', 'not negotiable', and 'cannot rationalize your way out of it' to ensure the agent follows the framework's skill-invocation logic.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Establishes an instruction hierarchy where the skill's rules and user instructions are explicitly prioritized over the agent's default behavior, which is a common pattern for defining specific agent personas but technically constitutes a behavioral override.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by prioritizing external content (such as CLAUDE.md and scope.json) as the highest instruction priority without specifying sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: CLAUDE.md, scope.json, and direct user requests are used to determine engagement tasks and boundaries.
  • Boundary markers: Lacks explicit delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the data ingested from the user or external files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill manages and routes to 31 other technique-focused skills (e.g., recon, exploit-dev, cloud) using the Skill tool.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the contents of CLAUDE.md or scope.json is described.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 2, 2026, 01:41 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — using-offensive-claude