dev-platform-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external sources, specifically GitHub issues and pull requests, using commands like
gh issue viewandgh pr viewto fetch conversations, bodies, and comments. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions could be embedded in external content to manipulate the agent's actions during code implementation or PR reviews. - Ingestion Points: Data enters the agent's context through
ghCLI commands inreferences/github-workflow.mdandSKILL.md. - Boundary Markers: The skill does not explicitly define character-based delimiters for untrusted input, though it separates review and implementation tasks into dedicated worktrees.
- Capability Inventory: The agent has the capability to write files, create commits, push to remote branches, and interact with Atlassian APIs (Jira/Confluence).
- Sanitization: No specific content sanitization or escaping mechanisms for the fetched issue/PR text are defined in the provided files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions involve significant use of system commands, including
gitfor repository management andghfor GitHub API interactions. - Evidence:
references/github-workflow.mdcontains numerous examples of command execution, such asgit push,gh issue edit, andgh apicalls. - Mitigation: The skill includes a robust permission model for sensitive actions, instructing the agent to treat commits, pushes, and PR creation as actions requiring explicit human approval or orchestrator coordination.
Audit Metadata