orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface due to the ingestion of untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches content from external sources including GitHub issues (
gh issue view), pull requests (gh pr view), Jira API responses, and local files (memo <path>) as defined in the 'Source Types' section ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing the content of fetched issues or Jira tickets.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write files via
mkoutput, execute code through subagents usingcodex exec, and perform repository modifications viagh pr create. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation is present for data ingested from the 'Source Types' before it is interpolated into planning documents or worker tasks.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes command-line tools for automation and subagent management.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions to executegh(GitHub CLI) for issue and PR management, andcodex execfor running code tasks. - Context: The
codex execcommand is used with the--sandboxflag and subagents are explicitly constrained toREADONLYcapability, which serves as a security control.
Audit Metadata