inbox-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands to perform file management tasks within the user's environment.
- Evidence: Uses
ls "$VAULT/Inbox/" --ignore="Attachments"to retrieve a list of files to process. - Evidence: Instructs the agent to use the
mvcommand to relocate files according to the PARA organizational principle. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from the local file system.
- Ingestion points: File names and contents are read from the
$VAULT/Inbox/directory (SKILL.md, step 1 and 5). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions defining delimiters to separate file content from the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent can move files via
mv, modify file content (frontmatter updates), and interact with other skills likememorb-ingest. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe any validation or escaping mechanisms for the data found within the triaged files.
Audit Metadata