academic-slides-iterative
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external content which creates a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: In Phase 0, the skill reads source code files and JSON logs (e.g.,
planner_state.json,world_model.json) to gather material for slides. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when reading these external files, which could allow malicious content in the files to influence the agent's behavior.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executepdflatex,git,gh, andhfcommands. It also hasWriteandEditpermissions to create and modify files based on the ingested data. - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or escaping mechanisms for the data retrieved from external logs and code before it is interpolated into LaTeX templates or markdown outlines.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing local scripts and system binaries to perform its core functions.
- Evidence: The skill executes
scripts/render_and_check.shandscripts/md2pdf.pyusing theBashtool. - Evidence: It invokes
pdflatexfor document rendering andpdftoppmfor visual verification of the generated slides. - Evidence: Phase 4 involves executing
gitandhf(Hugging Face) CLI tools to push the final documents to remote repositories, provided the user grants permission.
Audit Metadata