deepswe-analyze
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to analyze "full transcripts" and "task statements" from other agent trials (found in
jobs/analysis-briefs/). This presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a trial transcript could influence the analyzer sub-agents. - Ingestion points: Files located at
/w/seungpil.lee/deepswe/jobs/analysis-briefs/<id>.mdand.win.mdcontaining full agent message histories. - Boundary markers: The workflow prompts do not use explicit delimiters or "ignore previous instructions" warnings when presenting the transcripts to the judge agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read/write access, the ability to execute shell commands via sub-agents, and the ability to spawn new agent instances.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the transcript content before it is processed by the Sonnet/Opus judge models.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The JavaScript workflows in
references/workflows/frequently use shell commands to manage the analysis process. - Evidence: Agents are instructed to use
sedto read specific trial IDs,ls,sort, andawkfor sharding file lists, andmkdirfor directory creation. - Evidence: The
Sitephase in multiple workflows starts a local web server (python3 -m http.server) and executeschromium-browser --headlesswith the--no-sandboxflag to take verification screenshots. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes code dynamically at runtime.
- Evidence:
references/workflows/3-winners-contrast.jsconstructs a multi-line Python script that is piped directly into the interpreter (`python - <<'PY'
) to processtrials.json` and generate task pairs. - Evidence: Sub-agents are tasked with modifying Python source code (
deepswe/collect.py) and HTML (site/index.html) to integrate new analysis fields.
Audit Metadata