hwpx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pydynamically generates C source code and compiles it at runtime into a shared library (.so) usinggcc. This library is then injected into thesofficeprocess using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept and shim low-level system calls such assocket,listen,accept, andclose. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts, including
scripts/office/soffice.py,scripts/convert_hwp.py, andscripts/convert_to_pdf.py, use thesubprocessmodule to execute system commands such asgccandsofficewith user-supplied arguments and environment modifications. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdinstructs the user to install the external Node.js package@ssabrojs/hwpxjsand mentions dependencies on external tools like LibreOffice and Poppler (pdftoppm). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides tools for reading and extracting content from HWPX documents, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the processed documents contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Document content is read from external HWPX files via
scripts/extract_text.pyandscripts/extract_tables.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or safety instructions to distinguish ingested document data from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including file system access (
pack.py,unpack.py), command execution, and runtime compilation of native code. - Sanitization: Extracted XML and text data are processed and displayed to the agent without any visible sanitization or filtering.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata