subagent-driven-development
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external implementation plans and task descriptions, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in a plan could influence subagent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The workflow reads implementation plans (e.g.,
docs/superpowers/plans/feature-plan.md) and extracts task descriptions to feed into subagent prompts inimplementer-prompt.mdandspec-reviewer-prompt.md. - Capability inventory: Subagents are granted capabilities to write/modify code files, execute tests, and perform git operations such as commits.
- Boundary markers: The prompt templates utilize markdown headers (
## Task Description,## Context) to delimit data, but they lack explicit instructions for the subagents to ignore or treat instructions within the task description as data rather than commands. - Sanitization: There is no mentioned process for sanitizing or validating the contents of the implementation plan before it is processed.
- Risk Factor: The "Continuous execution" directive in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to execute all tasks without human intervention, which could allow a malicious plan to perform multiple unauthorized actions sequentially before detection.
Audit Metadata