using-superpowers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative, high-pressure language to override the agent's internal reasoning and default behavior.
- Evidence in
SKILL.md: 'YOU ABSOLUTELY MUST invoke the skill', 'This is not negotiable. This is not optional. You cannot rationalize your way out of this.' - The 'Red Flags' section explicitly instructs the agent to ignore its own internal logic or justifications for not using a tool (e.g., 'This is just a simple question', 'I need more context first', 'Let me explore the codebase first').
- It forces a specific sequence of operations ('before ANY response including clarifying questions') which bypasses the agent's autonomy in determining the best response strategy.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a behavior hierarchy that prioritizes instructions from external workspace files, which could contain malicious directives if the environment is compromised.
- Ingestion points:
CLAUDE.md,GEMINI.md, andAGENTS.mdare identified as high-priority instruction sources inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are provided for these ingested files.
- Capability inventory: The skill establishes tool mappings for file system access (
Write,Edit), shell execution (Bash), and subagent dispatch (Task) across the reference files (references/codex-tools.md,references/copilot-tools.md,references/gemini-tools.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content within these external files is described.
Audit Metadata