using-superpowers

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative, high-pressure language to override the agent's internal reasoning and default behavior.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: 'YOU ABSOLUTELY MUST invoke the skill', 'This is not negotiable. This is not optional. You cannot rationalize your way out of this.'
  • The 'Red Flags' section explicitly instructs the agent to ignore its own internal logic or justifications for not using a tool (e.g., 'This is just a simple question', 'I need more context first', 'Let me explore the codebase first').
  • It forces a specific sequence of operations ('before ANY response including clarifying questions') which bypasses the agent's autonomy in determining the best response strategy.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a behavior hierarchy that prioritizes instructions from external workspace files, which could contain malicious directives if the environment is compromised.
  • Ingestion points: CLAUDE.md, GEMINI.md, and AGENTS.md are identified as high-priority instruction sources in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are provided for these ingested files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill establishes tool mappings for file system access (Write, Edit), shell execution (Bash), and subagent dispatch (Task) across the reference files (references/codex-tools.md, references/copilot-tools.md, references/gemini-tools.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content within these external files is described.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 11:42 AM