geo-content
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from untrusted external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/fetch_page.py(fetches web content) andscripts/brand_scanner.py(reads local text/HTML files). - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/skill-contract.mdexplicitly state to treat scraped text, reviews, and third-party exports as untrusted input and not to follow embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses network read capabilities (
scripts/fetch_page.py), local file system access (scripts/brand_scanner.py), and the ability to write findings into the agent context. - Sanitization: No programmatic sanitization or structural isolation is implemented for the ingested text before it is presented to the model.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/citability_scorer.pyuses dynamic module loading which can be used to obfuscate intent. - Evidence: The script uses
__import__('sys')to read from standard input. While the usage in this context is benign and limited to a standard library module, dynamic imports are a common technique for bypassing static code analysis. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes functionality to download content from arbitrary external URLs.
- Evidence:
scripts/fetch_page.pyusesurllib.requestto retrieve content from remote servers. - Mitigation: The utility implements strong security controls, including a
validate_urlfunction that blocks non-global IP addresses (preventing SSRF) and disallows URLs with embedded credentials.
Audit Metadata