zmm-cut
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the invocation of local command-line tools for media analysis and processing.
- Evidence: Instructs the agent to use
ffmpegfor read-only inspection of source file metadata. - Evidence: References the use of
whisper.cpp,mlx_whisper, andfaster-whisperfor local audio transcription. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes transcription data which serves as a potential vector for indirect prompt injection from audio content.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests transcripts generated by the ChatCut plugin or local ASR models (e.g., Whisper) as described in
references/ChatCut实操.md. - Boundary markers: While the skill includes strict behavioral constraints like "只删和重排,不加词" (only delete and reorder, no adding words), it lacks explicit prompt delimiters to segregate transcription data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to modify project timelines (
apply_script), interact with the ChatCut plugin API, and execute shell-based media tools. - Sanitization: No specific input sanitization or validation logic is defined to filter malicious prompts embedded within processed transcripts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources for supplementary functionality.
- Evidence: Fetches face detection models (
YuNet) frommedia.githubusercontent.com/media/...to facilitate privacy-preserving blurring of bystanders. This source is a standard distribution platform for GitHub-hosted assets and is handled neutrally. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill supports a fallback execution path involving local runtime execution of media models.
- Evidence: Provides instructions for a "本机转写旁路" (local transcription bypass) which involves executing Whisper-based models on the host machine when primary cloud-based plugins are unavailable.
Audit Metadata