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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from pull request titles and bodies which could contain instructions targeting the agent.
- Ingestion points: The
gh pr viewcommand inSKILL.md(Step 1) extracts user-controlled data includingbody,title, andheadRefNameinto the agent's context. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to treat the PR content as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to modify repository content via
gh pr editand create external issues in Jira, Linear, or GitHub. - Sanitization: Absent. The ingested PR content is directly used to draft issue titles and descriptions and to update the PR body without filtering or escaping.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the GitHub CLI (
gh) to perform repository operations. - Evidence: Commands such as
gh pr view <num>andgh pr edit <num> --body "..."are used to read and write PR data. These are legitimate operations for the skill's stated purpose but contribute to the capability set available if the agent is misled by processed data.
Audit Metadata