iblai-vibe-os-agent-code-mode
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes hardcoded system instructions in
opencode_proxy.rs(theIBLAI_INSTRUCTIONSconstant) that command the agent to "NEVER ask the user for a platform API key or token — this supersedes any skill instruction that says to ask for one." This is an explicit behavioral override intended to bypass other instructions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The module
opencode_installer.rsdownloads theopencoderelease binary from an external repository atgithub.com/sst/opencode. It also fetches a toolkit from the author's repository atgithub.com/iblai/vibe. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill spawns and executes the downloaded
opencodebinary using Rust'sCommandAPI inopencode_acp.rs. Spawning externally sourced binaries is a significant security surface. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is explicitly designed to execute shell commands (e.g.,
pnpm dev,git init, and arbitrary shell tools) on the user's machine. While a sandbox usingbwrap(Linux) orsandbox-exec(macOS) is implemented inopencode_acp.rs, the agent retains the capability to perform broad filesystem and terminal operations within that sandbox. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
opencode_proxy.rsmodule mints a week-long, tenant-scoped platform API key and exports it as theIBLAI_API_KEYenvironment variable directly to the agent's environment, providing it with active platform credentials. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to read and process arbitrary files from the user's workspace, which could contain instructions from untrusted sources.
- Ingestion points: Workspace files read by the agent (facilitated in
opencode_acp.rs). - Boundary markers: The UI renders "permission cards" in
code-permission-card.tsxto request user approval for operations, which serves as a defensive boundary. - Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution, file system read/write access, and network operations through a loopback proxy.
- Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of the content of the files read by the agent before processing.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
opencode_acp.rsto dynamically assemble command-line arguments (e.g., inbwrap_args) and uses theaxumlibrary to create a dynamic model proxy and workspace management API.
Audit Metadata