iblai-vibe-security-recon

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the $ARGUMENTS variable directly within several shell commands, including dig any $ARGUMENTS, whois $ARGUMENTS, and nmap ... $ARGUMENTS. This pattern presents a risk of command injection if the input provided to the variable contains shell metacharacters and is not properly sanitized.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to the ingestion of untrusted external content.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through certificate transparency logs from crt.sh and web content retrieved via WebSearch and WebFetch tools.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are present when processing external data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows for powerful operations via the Bash, Write, and WebFetch tools, which can be abused if the agent's logic is subverted by external data.
  • Sanitization: There is no logic provided to sanitize or validate the content fetched from the internet before it is used to generate reports or influence subsequent steps.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 7, 2026, 01:01 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — iblai-vibe-security-recon