issue-fields-migration

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions specify that for migrations involving more than 100 issues, the agent should generate a standalone shell script for the user to run locally. This script is constructed using data fetched from external GitHub sources, such as label names and project field values. There is a risk of command injection if the agent fails to properly escape or sanitize these strings before embedding them into the generated bash script.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external GitHub repositories (labels, project items, and field values). This data is used to 'Auto-suggest mappings' and populate commands. An attacker with write access to a repository could craft label names or project data designed to influence the agent's logic or corrupt the generated migration scripts.
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched via gh label list, mcp__github__projects_list, and gh issue list from user-specified repositories.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or security headers to separate external data from the agent's internal instruction logic during processing.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform write and delete operations via the gh CLI and REST API, and it can generate executable shell scripts.
  • Sanitization: While the skill mentions URL-encoding label names for REST API paths, it lacks explicit instructions for the comprehensive sanitization required when generating shell scripts from external string data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 18, 2026, 02:35 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — issue-fields-migration