agent-factory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
create_worker_agentfunction inSKILL.mdaccepts ataskdictionary and interpolates several fields, includingtask_instructions,acceptance, andname, directly into a generatedSKILL.mdfile for worker agents. There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or boundary markers to prevent thetask_instructionsfrom containing malicious prompt injection that could override the worker agent's intended behavior. - Ingestion points: The
taskobject passed tocreate_worker_agent(specifically thetask_instructions,acceptance, andnamefields). - Boundary markers: None identified; the values are substituted directly into the template via string replacement.
- Capability inventory: The skill spawns autonomous subagents using the
Tasktool, writes files to the local file system (write_file), creates directories (os.makedirs), and removes directories (shutil.rmtree). - Sanitization: None identified; placeholders like
{task_instructions}are replaced with raw string values. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a runtime agent factory that generates executable agent skill files (
SKILL.md) by substituting task-specific data into markdown templates. These generated skills are subsequently executed by spawning subagents through theTasktool in thedispatch_workersfunction. While this is the primary purpose of the skill, the incorporation of unsanitized external input into the generated executable content poses a security risk.
Audit Metadata