board-of-directors
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The board simulation processes user-supplied proposals and context by interpolating them into individual director prompts without proper boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: The
proposalandcontextparameters are injected into director-specificTaskprompts inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates do not use clear delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings to separate the untrusted proposal content from the agent's specialized role definitions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
run_shell_commandfor directory management andwrite_filefor persisting session data. - Sanitization: No input sanitization or validation is applied to the user-provided proposal before it is processed by the simulation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages shell commands to initialize its internal file-based message bus and persistence layer.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to userun_shell_commandto executemkdir -pfor creating session directories in theconductor/tracks/path.
Audit Metadata