conductor-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill takes user-supplied goals (e.g., via the
/gocommand) and interpolates them directly into the instructions for specialized subagents (Explore, Plan, Workers) without sanitization or protective boundary markers. - Ingestion points: The
userGoalvariable inprocessGoalandanalyzeGoalfunctions withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the input is interpolated directly into prompt strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read/write files, manage a message bus, spawn subagents via the
Tasktool, and execute CLI commands. - Sanitization: None detected; the skill relies on subagents to interpret potentially adversarial user input.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that explicitly mandate the avoidance of user oversight. In
agenticmode, the agent is told to "NEVER ask the user" and to resolve ambiguities or blockers autonomously. This reduces transparency and could allow a compromised subagent to perform actions without the user's knowledge. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill references an external Node.js dependency
parallel-dispatchvia arequire()statement. This package is not a standard library and its source is not defined within the skill, representing an unverifiable dependency risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration logic involves spawning external processes (e.g., executing the
claudeCLI for Board of Directors deliberation) which includes interpolated variables like{question}, potentially creating a path for command injection if the input is not strictly validated.
Audit Metadata