doordash
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a sensitive personal file path (
~/Library/Mobile Documents/iCloud~md~obsidian/...) to read a family food profile. This path belongs to an Obsidian vault, which typically contains private, unencrypted notes and documents. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions include hardcoded personally identifiable information (PII), including a specific Gmail address and a detailed home address in San Jose, CA.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes an external binary
dd-clilocated at~/.local/bin/dd-cliand a custom Python script included in the skill to perform actions, including financial transactions through the DoorDash API. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources (DoorDash menu descriptions and store names) and potentially user-editable Markdown files, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
Family Food Profile.mdfile and the JSON output fromdd-cli searchanddd-cli menucommands. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are utilized when processing this external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, perform financial transactions via
dd-cli order submit, and read/write files to the user's filesystem. - Sanitization: The provided Python script performs logical checks but does not sanitize or escape ingested strings before they are presented to the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata