architecture-decision

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation mentions the syntax !command as a 'full check pattern' for director gates in .claude/docs/director-gates.md. While the skill itself does not invoke dangerous shell commands in its markdown, it references a framework where dynamic context injection is a standard feature. Analysis of the skill instructions shows that these commands are intended for status checks (e.g., git status) and project-specific tooling within a development workflow.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it reads external, potentially untrusted documentation and configuration files (docs/engine-reference/, design/gdd/, docs/registry/architecture.yaml) and interpolates their content into prompts for the agent or sub-agents (Engine Specialists, Technical Director).
  • Ingestion points: docs/engine-reference/[engine]/VERSION.md, docs/engine-reference/[engine]/modules/[domain].md, design/gdd/*.md, docs/registry/architecture.yaml.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses clear visual formatting for generated ADRs and assumptions, but does not explicitly use structural delimiters (like XML tags) to wrap all external data during the inference step.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has Read, Write, Glob, Grep, and Task capabilities, allowing it to modify the file system and spawn sub-agents based on the processed data.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of automated sanitization (like escaping or filtering) for the content read from external markdown/YAML files before it is processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 6, 2026, 09:20 AM