architecture-decision
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation mentions the syntax
!commandas a 'full check pattern' for director gates in.claude/docs/director-gates.md. While the skill itself does not invoke dangerous shell commands in its markdown, it references a framework where dynamic context injection is a standard feature. Analysis of the skill instructions shows that these commands are intended for status checks (e.g.,git status) and project-specific tooling within a development workflow. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it reads external, potentially untrusted documentation and configuration files (
docs/engine-reference/,design/gdd/,docs/registry/architecture.yaml) and interpolates their content into prompts for the agent or sub-agents (Engine Specialists, Technical Director). - Ingestion points:
docs/engine-reference/[engine]/VERSION.md,docs/engine-reference/[engine]/modules/[domain].md,design/gdd/*.md,docs/registry/architecture.yaml. - Boundary markers: The skill uses clear visual formatting for generated ADRs and assumptions, but does not explicitly use structural delimiters (like XML tags) to wrap all external data during the inference step.
- Capability inventory: The skill has
Read,Write,Glob,Grep, andTaskcapabilities, allowing it to modify the file system and spawn sub-agents based on the processed data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of automated sanitization (like escaping or filtering) for the content read from external markdown/YAML files before it is processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata