dev-story
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from multiple external-facing project files and passes the aggregated content to sub-agents via the
Tasktool, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Reads content from user-provided story paths,
docs/architecture/tr-registry.yaml, architectural decision records (ADRs),docs/architecture/control-manifest.md, and dependency stories inproduction/epics/**/*.md. - Boundary markers: The skill provides full content to sub-agents without specifying the use of robust delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings to separate the instructions from the potentially untrusted file data.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator and its spawned sub-agents have access to
Bash,Write, andTasktools, allowing for significant file system and command-line operations. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is defined for the content extracted from the various project files before it is interpolated into the context package for the programmer agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
BashandTasktools to navigate the file system, read project metadata, and execute sub-agents. While these are used for the skill's primary development purpose, the high level of autonomy in routing and implementing code based on file-driven context increases the risk if the input files are compromised.
Audit Metadata