blender-agent-benchmark
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill spawns several external processes including
codex,blender, andffprobe. Inscripts/run_benchmark.ts, therunCodexfunction allows for the use of the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxand--sandbox danger-full-accessflags. These flags explicitly instruct the underlying runner to disable security sandboxes and auto-approve all tool calls, which can lead to unrestricted system access if misused by an agent or user. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill determines binary paths for execution from environment variables such as
FFPROBE_EXECUTABLEandBLENDER_EXECUTABLE, or from user-supplied command-line arguments like--blender. This allows an attacker with control over the environment to redirect tool calls to arbitrary malicious binaries. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions that tell the agent to bypass security filters for specific benchmark conditions. These instructions, while intended for automation in a controlled environment, follow patterns used to override safety guidelines and can be exploited to execute unvetted tasks without user oversight. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
Bun.spawnto run a local Model Context Protocol (MCP) server defined atmcp/server.ts(not included in the source), providing a mechanism for dynamic code execution that is invoked during the benchmarking process.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata