blender-agent-benchmark

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill spawns several external processes including codex, blender, and ffprobe. In scripts/run_benchmark.ts, the runCodex function allows for the use of the --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox and --sandbox danger-full-access flags. These flags explicitly instruct the underlying runner to disable security sandboxes and auto-approve all tool calls, which can lead to unrestricted system access if misused by an agent or user.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill determines binary paths for execution from environment variables such as FFPROBE_EXECUTABLE and BLENDER_EXECUTABLE, or from user-supplied command-line arguments like --blender. This allows an attacker with control over the environment to redirect tool calls to arbitrary malicious binaries.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file contains instructions that tell the agent to bypass security filters for specific benchmark conditions. These instructions, while intended for automation in a controlled environment, follow patterns used to override safety guidelines and can be exploited to execute unvetted tasks without user oversight.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Bun.spawn to run a local Model Context Protocol (MCP) server defined at mcp/server.ts (not included in the source), providing a mechanism for dynamic code execution that is invoked during the benchmarking process.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 20, 2026, 08:13 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — blender-agent-benchmark