setup-environment
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted project manifest files to provide setup guidance, which constitutes a potential attack surface, but it implements robust prompt-level mitigations.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.mdandreferences/steps.md, the agent is instructed to read local files including.ruby-version,.tool-versions,Gemfile,docker-compose.yml,.env.example, andconfig/database.yml. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/steps.mdexplicitly command the agent to disregard natural language prose inREADME.md,CONTRIBUTING.md, or wiki pages and strictly forbid reading any filled-in.envfiles. - Capability inventory: The agent is restricted to generating text-based plans. Commands such as
bundle install,rails db:migrate, anddocker compose upfound inSKILL.md,EXAMPLES.md, andreferences/steps.mdare exclusively for user execution. The agent is explicitly prohibited from executing commands itself. - Sanitization: The skill relies on descriptive summarization and mismatch flagging rather than interpreting or executing logic found within the ingested manifests.
- [SAFE]: The skill demonstrates high security awareness by using SHA-pinned versions for GitHub Actions templates and maintaining a strict trust boundary where the agent never handles credentials or performs automated system changes.
Audit Metadata