version-api
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The code in
EXAMPLES.mduses the.constantizemethod in Rails to dynamically resolve class names based on strings extracted from theAcceptrequest header. While a regex is used for basic filtering, this pattern of dynamic dispatch to classes derived from external input is risky and specifically prohibited by the skill's ownHARD-GATEsafety instructions inSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a surface for processing untrusted data which could lead to logic bypass or injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via
request.headers['Accept']andrequest.path(as seen inEXAMPLES.md). - Boundary markers: The
SKILL.mdincludes aHARD-GATErequiring explicit allowlists for version resolution, but the actual implementation examples lack these markers. - Capability inventory: The skill is designed to modify core application files (controllers, routes) and executes shell commands via
bundle exec rspec. - Sanitization: Only basic regex filtering (
\\d+) is present in the examples, which does not safely prevent the dynamic resolution of unintended constants when using.constantize. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and workflow files (
SKILL.md,references/workflow.md) explicitly require the agent to execute shell commands (bundle exec rspec) for regression testing. This represents a capability for local command execution within the agent's environment.
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